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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Several organizations that represent and advocate for 
disabled individuals, sued under the Administrative 
Procedure Act alleging that the United States Department of 
Housing and Urban Development has abdicated its duty 
under the Fair Housing Act Amendments ("FHAA") and 
violated its own regulations under the Rehabilitation Act. 
ADAPT1 alleges that HUD has not fulfilled its statutory duty 
to ensure that multi-family housing is accessible and 
adaptable to persons with disabilities. ADAPT also claims 
that HUD fails to conduct adequate compliance reviews of 
recipients of federal aid, fails to conduct prompt 
investigations, and fails to take enforcement action when 
non-compliance is discovered. The District Court dismissed 
the claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted, finding that review was 
barred by sections 701 and 704 of the APA.2 We will affirm. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although there are several parties to the appeal, for ease of 
reference, 
when referring to the Appellants, we will refer only to the first party, 
American Disabled for Attendant Programs Today ("ADAPT"). 
2. We exercise plenary review of the District Court's grant of the 
12(b)(6) 
motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 
Ditri v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc., 954 F. 2d 869, 871 
(3d Cir. 1992). 
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I. 
 
Recognizing the need for accessible housing for people 
with physical disabilities, Congress enacted legislation that 
attempts to ensure that accessible housing is available to 
them. HUD has been charged with the duty to ensure that 
such housing is available. In June 1988, HUD issued 
specific regulations, implemented under Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, requiring that multi-family housing, 
newly constructed or substantially altered with the help of 
federal funding, must accommodate persons with physical 
disabilities. These regulations require that the building, 
common areas, and a minimum number of the housing 
units be accessible to people with physical disabilities. 
 
Congress passed the Fair Housing Act ("FHA") in 1968 to 
prevent housing discrimination. In 1988, it added the FHAA 
to include people with physical disabilities. The FHAA 
contains general design requirements for all multi-family 
housing with four or more units constructed after March 
13, 1991, regardless of whether the housing is federally 
funded. In addition to the requirement that all buildings 
and common areas be accessible, it also mandates that all 
dwelling units (as opposed to a minimum percentage under 
section 504) be accessible if they are on "accessible routes" 
(i.e., on floors accessible via building entrances or elevator). 
See 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(3)(C). The FHAA therefore attempts 
to make multi-family housing generally accessible to 
individuals with disabilities with a minimum impact on the 
design of the housing. 
 
In its complaint, ADAPT alleges that HUD has received 
complaints of nationwide non-compliance with the 
accessibility requirements of its Section 504 regulations, 
including a 1994 complaint by advocates for the disabled in 
response to which HUD officials allegedly acknowledged 
widespread compliance problems. ADAPT alleges that, 
despite these complaints, HUD has failed to (1) collect data 
on whether disabled persons benefit from its funding; (2) 
monitor grants before or after funds are spent to determine 
whether they are used to create accessible housing; (3) 
conduct prompt investigations of possible noncompliance; 
or (4) take enforcement action upon notice of 
noncompliance. ADAPT asserts that this inaction amounts 
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to an abdication by HUD of its duty to enforce its own 
Section 504 regulations. ADAPT also claims that this 
inaction is in violation of the agency's duty under the FHAA 
to "administer the programs and activities relating to 
housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively 
to further the policies" of the Act. 42 U.S.C. S 3608(e)(5). 
 
ADAPT sought review under the APA, 5 U.S.C. SS 701- 
710. The relief sought by ADAPT includes a declaration that 
HUD is violating both Section 504 and the FHAA, and an 
injunction forcing HUD to "(1) administer its housing and 
urban development programs and activities so as 
affirmatively to further the Fair Housing Act's policy of 
promoting integration of people with physical disabilities 
into the community through the creation of accessible 
housing" and "(2) assure that recipients of HUD funding 
comply with Section 504's housing accessibility 
requirements." 
 
The District Court held that the APA prevented judicial 
review of the type ADAPT was requesting. The court 
concluded that ADAPT had not rebutted the presumption 
that HUD's actions were unreviewable under section 701 of 
the APA. In addition, the court found that ADAPT could not 
demonstrate that it was appealing from a final agency 
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in 
court, as required by section 704 of the APA. Finally, the 
court ruled that ADAPT had failed to properly plead its 
argument that HUD discriminated directly against disabled 
individuals. The District Court dismissed these direct 
claims, but granted ADAPT leave to amend their complaint. 
ADAPT instead appealed. 
 
II. 
 
The APA establishes a framework that permits courts to 
review agency actions. It waives federal sovereign immunity 
in certain circumstances to allow equitable relief from 
agency action or inaction. See 5 U.S.C. S 702. If review is 
allowed, a court may "compel agency action unlawfully 
withheld or unreasonably delayed" or "hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action" that is determined to be "arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion," or "short of statutory 
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right." Id. S 706. The APA allows judicial review of agency 
actions unless the "(1) statute[ ] preclude[s] judicial review; 
or (2) [the] agency action is committed to agency discretion 
by law." 5 U.S.C. S 701(a). Whether an agency action falls 
under prong (2) and is "committed to agency discretion by 
law" is determined by a "construction of the substantive 
statute involved to determine whether Congress intended to 
preclude judicial review of certain decisions." Heckler v. 
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828-29, 105 S. Ct. 1649, 1654 
(1985). 
 
Agency actions are typically presumed to be reviewable 
under the APA. Importantly however, the Supreme Court 
has established a presumption against judicial review of 
agency decisions that involve whether to undertake 
investigative or enforcement actions.3  See Chaney, 470 U.S. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In Chaney, the Supreme Court explained its hesitance to review 
agency decisions not to enforce as such: 
 
       This Court has recognized on several occasions . . . that an 
agency's 
       decision not to prosecute or enforce . . . is a decision generally 
       committed to an agency's absolute discretion. This recognition of 
the 
       existence of discretion is attributable in no small part to the 
general 
       unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse 
       enforcement. 
 
       The reasons for this general unsuitability are many. First, an 
agency 
       decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a 
       number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, 
       the agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, 
       but whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or 
       another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, 
whether 
       the particular enforcement action requested bestfits the agency's 
       overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough 
       resources to undertake the action at all. An agency generally 
cannot 
       act against each technical violation of the statute it is charged 
with 
       enforcing. The agency is far better equipped than the courts to 
deal 
       with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its 
       priorities. 
 
       In addition to these administrative concerns, we note that when an 
       agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coercive 
       power over an individual's liberty or property rights, and thus 
does 
       not infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to 
protect. 
       . . . Finally, we recognize that an agency's refusal to institute 
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at 838, 105 S. Ct. at 1659. Noting that "an agency decision 
not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a 
number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise," 
the Court stated that "[t]he agency is far better equipped 
than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in 
the proper ordering of its priorities." Id. at 831-32, 105 S. 
Ct. at 1655-56. This presumption of enforcement decision 
unreviewability may be rebutted, however, "where the 
substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency 
to follow in exercising its enforcement powers." Id. at 832- 
33, 105 S. Ct. at 1656. Thus, we may review HUD's 
enforcement decisions only if Congress has granted us 
power to review by providing us with guidelines or"law to 
apply." 
 
A. Section 504 
 
In June 1988, under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,4 
HUD issued regulations addressing the accessibility of 
multi-family housing projects built or substantially altered 
with federal financial assistance. ADAPT's argument 
revolves around HUD's alleged failure to investigate and 
enforce violations of one of these regulations - 24 C.F.R. 
S 8.22. This regulation directs that, in addition to accessible 
buildings and common areas, 5% (but not less than 1) of 
the units in each covered building must be accessible and 
adaptable to individuals with mobility impairments. In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the 
decision 
       of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict--a decision 
       which has long been regarded as the special province of the 
       Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged 
       by the Constitution to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
       executed." 
 
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831-32, 105 S. Ct. at 1655-56. 
 
4. Section 504 provides "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual 
. . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive 
agency." 29 U.S.C. S 794. 
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addition, 2% (but not less than 1) of the units must be 
accessible to hearing and vision impaired individuals.5 
 
ADAPT claims that HUD has completely abdicated its 
responsibility by failing to initiate investigations and 
enforcement actions to ensure that housing providers that 
receive federal funding are obeying the 5%-2% requirement. 
Because this is precisely the type of agency decision that is 
presumed unreviewable under Chaney, the question before 
us is whether ADAPT can overcome the Chaney 
presumption by demonstrating that Congress intended to 
permit review by providing courts with law to apply. 
 
       1. Investigation 
 
ADAPT's strongest argument is that HUD's refusal to 
investigate pursuant to the section 504 regulations is 
reviewable under the APA. 24 C.F.R. S 8.56(b) states that 
HUD "shall make a prompt investigation whenever a 
compliance review, report, complaint or any other 
information indicates a possible failure to comply with this 
part." 24 C.F.R. S 8.56(b) (emphasis added). The 5%-2% 
mandate is included in the part, and so covered by the 
regulation. See id. S 8.22. "[S]hall" indicates that a non- 
discretionary duty to investigate arises when HUD receives 
information concerning a possible failure to comply.6 
 
The District Court agreed that a mandatory duty was 
created by section 8.56(b). The court, however, held that 
"the regulations do[ ] not set forth significant, substantive 
standards as to the circumstances in which HUD willfind 
`possible failure to comply.' " Dist. Ct. at 18. In other words, 
the court found that Congress did not supply the 
substantive standards to judge the conduct necessary to 
rebut the Chaney presumption against review. ADAPT 
argues that the 5%-2% mandate does provide substantive 
standards, i.e., 5% and 2% of the units must be accessible. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The parties and the District Court refer to section 8.22 as the "5%-2%" 
regulation. For consistency, we will use this term as well. 
 
6. At oral argument, counsel for HUD suggested that "shall" in fact 
created only a discretionary duty as interpreted by HUD. An agency can 
not avoid a mandatory duty, however, simply by averring that it 
interprets clearly mandatory language as discretionary. 
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ADAPT confuses the existence of a standard restricting 
federal funding recipients with the existence of a standard 
by which to judge HUD's conduct. In this case, the 5%-2% 
mandate is not adequate "law to apply" to help us discern 
guidelines to apply to HUD's enforcement and investigation 
decisions. 
 
Our opinion in Harmon Cove Condominium Association v. 
Marsh, 815 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1987), is instructive. In 
Harmon Cove, a condominium association brought an 
action against the Secretary of the Army to compel the 
Secretary to enforce a permit issued to the condominium 
developers. The association claimed that section 404 of the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which included 
language similar to section 8.56(b),7 imposed a duty on the 
Secretary to enforce compliance with the conditions of the 
permit. See id. at 952. The permit contained explicit terms 
that bound the recipients, much like the section 504 
regulations contain specific terms that bind housing 
providers that receive federal funding. Despite these explicit 
terms, we found that the APA did not allow us to review the 
agency's decision not to enforce the terms of the permit. We 
stated that "[t]he statute imposes no duty on the Secretary 
to make a finding of violation, because it contains no 
guidelines for the Secretary to follow in choosing to initiate 
enforcement activity." Id. 
 
We rejected the association's argument that it would be 
"anomalous" to issue a permit and then not enforce the 
conditions of the permit. This argument mirrors ADAPT's 
claim that HUD has a duty to ensure that the conditions of 
the funding grants are followed by housing providers. As we 
noted in Harmon Cove, "[t]he short answer is that in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The relevant portion of section 404 provided, 
 
       Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the 
       Secretary finds that any person is in violation of any condition or 
       limitation set forth in a permit issued by the Secretary under this 
       section, the Secretary shall issue an order requiring such person 
to 
       comply with such condition or limitation, or the Secretary shall 
       bring a civil action in accordance with paragraph (3) of this 
       subsection. 
 
Harmon Cove, 815 F.2d at 952 (emphasis added). 
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absence of some guidelines binding the [agency's] 
enforcement decisions, [we] are bound by the Supreme 
Court's ruling that such determinations are left to the 
[agency]." Id. at 953. 
 
ADAPT asks us to review whether HUD has 
systematically failed to investigate in the face of national 
noncompliance with the 5%-2% requirement. Congress has 
provided no guidelines, or law to apply, to constrain HUD's 
decision to investigate violations of its regulations. 
Therefore, we have no choice but to conclude that these 
decisions are committed exclusively to agency discretion.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. ADAPT asserts that HUD has received complaints about nationwide 
noncompliance with the 5%-2% mandate, that HUD officials have 
privately acknowledged awareness of noncompliance, but that HUD has 
not responded by launching the requisite investigation. ADAPT contends 
that HUD has therefore violated 24 C.F.R. S 8.56(b), which, as noted, 
provides in pertinent part that HUD "shall make a prompt investigation 
whenever a . . . complaint . . . or any other information indicates a 
possible failure to comply with [the 5%-2% requirement]." Id. ADAPT 
argues that 24 C.F.R. S 8.56(b) is sufficiently specific to permit a court 
to review HUD's enforcement program because that regulation imposes 
upon HUD an inflexible duty to "make an investigation" whenever it 
receives any sort of "complaint" or any other sort of "information" 
indicating a possible failure to comply with the requirement in question. 
 
We cannot accept this argument. For one thing, HUD has discretion to 
interpret its own regulation, and in practice it has not given the 
regulation the rigid -- and almost certainly unworkable -- interpretation 
that ADAPT advances. Agencies charged with investigative and 
enforcement responsibilities receive all sorts of complaints and other 
information -- ranging from vague, anonymous tips to hard evidence 
from reliable sources -- concerning possible noncompliance with the 
laws that they are charged with enforcing. No such agency could 
function if it were duty-bound to undertake any sort of extensive 
investigation whenever any sort of complaint or information regarding a 
possible violation came to its attention. Reasonably read, 24 C.F.R. 
S 8.56 obligates HUD to undertake an investigation (of some sort) when 
the complaint or information it receives meets some standard of 
substantiality, and because this standard is not spelled out in any 
statute or regulation, HUD's decisions regarding the initiation of 
investigations are, under Chaney, not subject to APA review. 
 
Moreover, the concept of an investigation is itself broad, and we see no 
reason why HUD cannot interpret that concept as including the 
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       2. Enforcement 
 
Review of HUD's decisions whether to bring enforcement 
actions under the section 504 regulations is governed 
squarely by Chaney. The regulations promulgated under 
section 504 make it clear that HUD has discretion whether 
to bring enforcement actions in specific cases. See 24 
C.F.R. S 8.55(b) (HUD "may" require compliance reports 
from funding recipients "at such times, and in such form 
and containing such information, as the responsible civil 
rights official or his or her designee may determine to be 
necessary to enable him or her to ascertain whether the 
recipient has complied or is complying"); id. S 8.56(a) (HUD 
"may periodically review the practices of recipients to 
determine whether they are complying with this part and 
where he or she has a reasonable bases to do so may 
conduct on-site reviews"); id. S 8.57 (If actual or threatened 
non-compliance is found, HUD "may" refer the case to the 
Department of Justice for legal action or initiate 
proceedings for debarment or termination of federal 
funding). 
 
The same concerns that persuaded the Supreme Court to 
conclude the agency enforcement actions presumptively 
unreviewable in Chaney are here too. HUD is charged with 
monitoring and enforcing a broad array of housing anti- 
discrimination regulations. HUD must balance a number of 
factors, including, inter alia, expense, personnel resources, 
and likelihood of success. Compared to the courts, HUD is 
far more aware of its policies and priorities, and it should 
have the discretion to balance them. Finally, Congress has 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Department's internal consideration of the information that it receives in 
light of all that it knows about the housing field, its enforcement 
strategies, and its resources. If a court were to review whether HUD 
complied with 24 C.F.R. S 8.56 upon the receipt of a particular complaint 
or some other bit of "other information" indicating possible 
noncompliance, the court would have to determine whether this sort of 
purely internal inquiry was sufficient under the circumstances, and no 
statute or regulation that has been called to our attention provides a 
standard that the court could apply in making that determination. Thus, 
for this additional reason, we conclude that ADAPT's claim is not 
cognizable under the APA. 
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not provided any standards to limit HUD's discretion under 
the section 504 regulations so as to rebut the presumption 
of unreviewability, therefore, HUD's general investigative 
and enforcement policies are not reviewable under 
S 701(a)(2). 
 
B. FHAA 
 
ADAPT's claims under the FHAA are similar to its claims 
under section 504. ADAPT, however, claims that 42 U.S.C. 
S 3608(e)(5), which charges HUD to "administer the 
programs and activities relating to housing and urban 
development in a manner affirmatively to further the 
policies" of the FHA, provides an independent source of law 
for courts to apply. 42 U.S.C. S 3608(e)(5) (emphasis added).9 
 
       1. Framework of the FHA 
 
The FHA was enacted to address the problem of 
discrimination by federally funded housing providers. The 
FHA is similar to other civil rights laws in that it relies 
heavily on individual civilian complaints for enforcement. 
Congress passed the FHAA in 1988 to extend the FHA's 
protections against discrimination to people with physical 
disabilities.10 The FHAA provides that all common areas and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. ADAPT also argues that HUD is required under 42 U.S.C. S 3608(e)(6) 
to gather and disseminate information regarding compliance or 
noncompliance with the 5%-2% mandate and with other related matters. 
See Appellants' Br. at 13-14. However, ADAPT readsS 3608(e)(6) to mean 
much more than its language says. Under this provision, HUD is 
required "annually to report to the Congress, and make available to the 
public, data on the . . . handicap . . . of persons and households who are 
applicants for, participants in, or beneficiaries of [HUD programs]." In 
other words, this provision concerns data on any disabilities possessed 
by those who benefit or seek to benefit from HUD programs; the statute 
says nothing about data regarding the construction of housing, 
compliance with the 5%-2% mandate, or any of the other matters about 
which ADAPT appears to complain. Thus, we see no basis for reviewing 
ADAPT's data collection and dissemination claim under the APA. 
 
10. The FHAA added disabled persons to the classes of persons protected 
from both public and private housing discrimination, making it unlawful 
to "discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable 
or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter" on the basis of handicap. 42 
U.S.C. S 3604(f)(1). Discrimination on the basis of handicap includes 
failing to incorporate the accessibility and adaptability features 
specified 
in the Act. 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(3)(C). 
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all units on accessible routes (i.e., on floors accessible via 
building entrances or elevators) be made accessible to 
individuals with disabilities. These standards apply to all 
buildings, whether or not they are federally financed, built 
after March 13, 1991, with four or more housing units. So, 
the FHAA rejects the set aside approach of the section 504 
regulations in favor of broader, more general regulation of 
newly constructed multi-family housing. 
 
The FHAA requirements may be enforced in four ways. 
First, persons "aggrieved" by a discriminatory housing 
practice may file an administrative claim with HUD. HUD 
then has a mandatory duty to investigate these complaints. 
If, after investigation, HUD finds a reasonable basis for the 
complaint, it must bring a charge on behalf of the aggrieved 
person. See 42 U.S.C. S 3610. Second, an "aggrieved" 
person may completely bypass the administrative complaint 
process and file suit directly in federal court against the 
alleged discriminator. See id. S 3613. Under these two 
provisions, aggrieved persons can obtain compensatory and 
punitive damages, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and 
costs. 
 
Third, HUD may bring charges alleging discriminatory 
practices on its own initiative. See id. S 3610(a)(1)(A)(i). HUD 
may also initiate investigations to determine whether to 
bring enforcement complaints. Importantly, all provisions 
that concern HUD-initiated prosecution and investigation 
are couched with permissive language under the FHA. See 
id. (HUD "may also file such a complaint"); id. 
S 3610(a)(1)(A)(iii) (HUD "may also investigate housing 
practices to determine whether a complaint should be 
brought"). 
 
Fourth, the Attorney General may sue if she has 
reasonable cause to believe that a housing provider has 
been engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination. See 
id. S 3614. 
 
       2. Impact of "Affirmatively to Further " 
 
ADAPT argues that the "affirmatively to further" language 
in the FHA provides a basis for courts to review the 
investigative and enforcement actions (or, in this case, 
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inaction) of HUD under the FHAA. It claims that section 
3608(e)(5) imposes on HUD a duty to investigate and 
enforce the 5%-2% requirements of Section 504, a duty to 
gather statistical information on housing discrimination 
against disabled people, and a duty to take enforcement 
action to secure compliance with the FHAA. 
 
Were we to accept this argument we would be creating an 
independent guideline to limit HUD's discretion that would 
conflict with the plain text of the statute. The language of 
the FHA clearly mandates HUD investigative and 
enforcement action in only one instance -- when HUD is 
presented with an administrative complaint filed by an 
aggrieved person alleging discrimination. See id. S 3610. 
Nowhere does ADAPT allege that HUD has failed to act 
when presented with an administrative complaint of this 
type. All HUD-initiated investigative and enforcement 
actions under the FHA are accompanied by clearly 
discretionary language. 
 
Despite the plain language of the statute, ADAPT claims 
that the "affirmatively to further" language of the FHA 
places additional requirements on HUD regarding 
investigation and enforcement. ADAPT believes that 
Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970), supports its 
argument that the "affirmatively to further" language 
creates a reviewable duty under the APA. In Shannon, we 
held that HUD had not fulfilled its duties under the Civil 
Rights Acts when it approved an apartment project in an 
urban renewal area without considering the socio-economic 
impact of its decision. See id. at 820-21. We held that to 
ensure that it was affirmatively furthering integration, HUD 
had a duty to make an informed decision and gather 
material information concerning the socio-economic impact 
of a specific land use. See id. at 822. 
 
Shannon, decided approximately 15 years before the 
Supreme Court's Chaney decision, does not support the 
result proposed by ADAPT -- that HUD is required to 
collect all relevant data and to investigate all possible 
violations of the FHAA on a national level. In Shannon, we 
undertook a review of a specific decision by HUD and found 
that, when making the decision, HUD failed to consider all 
the relevant factors. See id. at 819. There is no dispute 
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that, much like a prosecutor, once an agency undertakes 
an enforcement action or makes an affirmative decision, it 
must proceed fairly and consider the mandates of the 
governing acts and regulations. In this case, HUD's 
regulations recognize that data collection is important; 
however, it has no affirmative duty under any statute or 
regulation to initiate nationwide investigation and 
prosecution of all potentially discriminatory housing 
practices. 
 
ADAPT also relies on the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision in NAACP v. HUD, 817 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1987). In 
NAACP, the court found that the APA allowed review of 
HUD's grant activity in Boston. The court ruled that, under 
the section 3608(e)(5) "affirmatively to further" language, 
when taking action, HUD's duty includes more than the 
obligation simply not to discriminate itself, the duty 
extends to using its grant programs affirmatively to assist 
in ending housing discrimination. See id. at 154-55. In 
other words, under section 3608(e)(5), when taking specific 
action, HUD had a duty to encourage, under the facts of 
NAACP, desegregation of federally funded housing. The 
court found that the pattern of specific examples of HUD's 
failure to enforce Title VII requirements justified judicial 
review. 
 
The court in NAACP held that the section 3608(e)(5) 
"affirmatively to further" language both created a duty and 
provided a specific standard by which to evaluate HUD's 
actions. There is, however, an essential difference between 
the specific activity reviewed by the court in NAACP and the 
all-encompassing review we are asked to undertake here. 
Specifically, in NAACP, the court found that it was able to 
review HUD's actions under the APA, in part, because the 
"NAACP aske[ed] for review of a series of decisions to 
determine, whether, taken together, they violate the 
obligation to further the goals of Title VIII." Id. at 159 
(emphasis added). ADAPT does not point to any specific 
decision (or decisions) made by HUD that did not further 
the polices of the FHAA. Rather ADAPT claims that after 
initial funding decisions have been made and the funding 
awarded, HUD has not investigated whether funding 
recipients have continued to follow the HUD requirements. 
 
                                14 
  
This critical distinction between a focused review of specific 
agency decisions and broad-based review of general agency 
policies regarding investigation and enforcement is what 
distinguishes NAACP and Shannon from this case. Even 
assuming that once HUD undertakes a discretionary action, 
and is required affirmatively to further the policies of the 
FHA and the FHAA, we may review its actions to ensure 
that it does, this is not such a case. 
 
To reiterate, the Supreme Court held in Chaney that 
there is a rebuttable presumption that agency decisions not 
to enforce are unreviewable. Under the FHA, Congress 
explicitly chose to give discretion to HUD when determining 
whether to prosecute and investigate. The "affirmatively to 
further" language cannot override the discretionary impact 
of the explicit language of the statute. 
 
Even though, in certain cases, the "affirmatively to 
further" language may furnish the courts with a standard 
of review, in this case Congress did not provide a 
substantive standard to apply to constrain HUD's 
enforcement and investigative decisions. We are not dealing 
with a challenge to specific HUD conduct; instead, we are 
faced with a broad-based attack on HUD's investigative and 
enforcement scheme. The numerous ways that HUD can 
allocate its resources and choose to affirmatively further the 
policies of the FHA illustrate the fact that the "affirmatively 
to further" language does not provide a meaningful 
substantive standard against which to judge HUD's 
generalized enforcement activities. The statutory language 
as well as the general enforcement structure of the FHA 
illustrate that discretion is given to HUD in all relevant 
instances. As such, review is precluded by the statute and, 
therefore, barred under section 701(a)(2) of the APA.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. ADAPT argues that the 3608(e)(5) "affirmatively to further" language 
in the FHA should be construed to require that HUD actively enforce the 
5%-2% requirements in its section 504 regulations. The section 504 
regulations were promulgated to fulfill HUD's requirements under the 
Rehabilitation Act, not the FHA. These two acts, while overlapping in 
some areas, differ in both procedure and focus. See Dist. Ct. at 4 n.4 
(District Court explanation). 
 
ADAPT argues that the section 504 regulations were, in fact, enacted 
to further the basic policy of the FHAA, which is to ensure equal access 
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III. 
 
Even if review were not barred by section 701, section 
704 of the APA would provide an independent barrier to 
review in this case. Section 704 allows judicial review of an 
agency action only if (1) the statute expressly authorizes it, 
or (2) the action at issue is a "final agency action for which 
there is no other adequate remedy in a court." 5 U.S.C. 
S 704. In this case, ADAPT correctly does not argue that the 
statute expressly authorizes review of the type it is seeking, 
so our only question is whether ADAPT can point to afinal 
HUD action for which no other adequate judicial remedy 
exists. 
 
Unlike, for example, in NAACP where the plaintiffs 
pointed to a pattern of specific grant decisions by HUD, in 
this case, no final agency action exists. ADAPT argues that 
HUD has completely abdicated enforcement of the FHAA 
and its regulations under section 504, particularly the 
5%-2% mandate. However, it does not point to any HUD 
action demonstrating this. As the District Court stated, 
 
       [ADAPT] do[es] not claim that HUD has failed to issue 
       regulations required by the FHAA, has issued 
       regulations inconsistent with the statute, or has 
       officially announced that it will not enforce the Act, and 
       do[es] not identify any other agency action or inaction 
       that has legal consequences, such as releasing third 
       parties from their legal duty to comply with the FHAA's 
       accessibility requirements. 
 
Id. at 15 n.17. 
 
ADAPT has neither exhausted, nor even resorted to, any 
administrative proceedings. As the Supreme Court noted in 
Chaney, "[w]hen an agency does act to enforce, that action 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to housing. While the general intent may be the same, the language of 
the FHA should not be construed to impute a duty to HUD under the 
Rehabilitation Act. 
 
However, even if the "affirmatively to further" language in the FHA 
could be imputed to apply to the section 504 regulations, the result 
would be the same as above. "Affirmatively to further" also provides no 
substantive standard against which to judge HUD's general enforcement 
scheme under the section 504 regulations. 
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itself provides a focus for judicial review, inasmuch as the 
agency must have exercised its power in some manner. The 
action at least can be reviewed to determine whether the 
agency exceeded its statutory powers." 470 U.S. at 832, 
105 S. Ct. at 1656. The lack of a final agency action in this 
case makes evaluation of ADAPT's claims improper because 
there is no decision on which we can focus. 
 
Not only does ADAPT fail to point to a final agency action, 
but an adequate judicial remedy also exists. They can 
pursue their claims of housing discrimination directly 
against federal-funding recipients, or they may bring 
administrative claims to HUD and trigger HUD's mandatory 
duty to investigate. If HUD refused to investigate afiled 
administrative claim, it could result in a violation of its 
duty under both the FHAA and the Rehabilitation Act, and 
trigger review by a court. 
 
The nature and structure of the FHA, together with its 
legislative history, indicate that the FHA was designed to 
operate like other civil rights laws. The focus of the APA is 
on individual actions against specific discriminators, not 
national enforcement by HUD. Congress has provided 
sufficient alternative remedies to physically disabled 
individuals victimized by housing discrimination. As the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals noted, "[t]o the extent 
Congress' assessment of alternate remedies is relevant, 
moreover, [Supreme Court precedent] suggests that 
Congress considered private suits to end discrimination not 
merely adequate but in fact the proper means for 
individuals to enforce Title VI and its sister 
antidiscrimination statutes." Women's Equity Action League 
v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (emphasis 
added). 
 
In Women's Equity Action League, the court was 
considering a broad-based challenge to the Department of 
Education's alleged failure to enforce various civil rights 
statutes against educational institutions that received 
federal funds. The court declined to review the actions 
under the APA because of the existence of the opportunity 
for individuals to bring direct actions against 
discriminators. See id. 
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While noting that direct suits may be "more arduous . . . 
and less effective" than judicial oversight of government 
enforcement, "situation-specific litigation affords an 
adequate, even if imperfect, remedy." Id. at 750. The court 
went on to state that "an APA suit to compel investigation 
and fund termination, although available `if no private 
remedy exists,' `is far more disruptive of [an agency's] 
efforts efficiently to allocate its enforcement resources . . . 
than a private suit against the recipient of federal aid.' " Id. 
(quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 707 
n.41, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1962 n.41 (1979)). In this case, a 
private right of action against individual housing providers 
that receive federal funding is provided for in the text of the 
statute. This remedy is clearly "adequate" in the section 
704 sense, and so judicial review is inappropriate on all 
counts. 
 
ADAPT argues that individual suits are not as effective as 
a review of HUD's national investigation and enforcement 
practices. While this may be true, section 704 does not 
require an equally effective remedy, only an adequate one. 
In this case, direct actions will be adequate to deter 
individual discriminators. Any HUD failure to initiate 
investigation or enforcement activities can be adequately 
remedied by the filing of individual administrative 
complaints. Once a complaint is filed, HUD must 
investigate and, if reasonable grounds are found, enforce 
the statutory regulations.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The District Court also dismissed ADAPT's claim that HUD directly 
discriminates in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. ADAPT 
argued that HUD directly discriminates against individuals with physical 
disabilities by maintaining unlawfully inaccessible housing in projects 
administered by the agency itself and by failing to collect data 
concerning disabled individuals while collecting data on the race and 
gender of individuals in HUD-financed housing. See Appellants' Brief at 
21-28. The District Court found that the claims and ADAPT's standing 
were not supported by the factual allegations in the record and so he 
dismissed the claim with leave to amend. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 5 n.5. 
ADAPT has not amended its complaint. 
 
A review of the complaint reveals that both of ADAPT's claims explicitly 
stated that the relief was being sought under the APA. See Appendix at 
31-36 (Second Amended Complaint). There is no mention of a direct 
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IV. 
 
In this case, ADAPT brought a broad claim challenging 
HUD's alleged nationwide failure to initiate investigations of 
housing discrimination against physically disabled 
individuals and its alleged failure to initiate enforcement of 
its regulations. Under the APA, this is not the type of claim 
that is appropriate for judicial review because it attacks a 
discretionary decision for which Congress has not provided 
reasonable standards to constrain HUD's actions. In 
addition, ADAPT has not met the requirement under 
section 704 that it identify a final agency action for which 
no other judicial remedy exists. Therefore, we affirm. 
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action against HUD. The District Court did not err when it concluded 
that ADAPT failed to allege a direct discrimination claim. In addition, 
ADAPT was granted leave to amend the complaint if it chooses to do so. 
 
It is not clear whether, even if they had properly asserted a direct 
claim, such a claim would be viable. The First Circuit in NAACP dealt 
with a similar direct challenge to HUD. The plaintiffs in that case 
characterized their claim as an "implied right of action" under the FHA. 
See NAACP, 817 F.2d at 152. The Court declined to allow such an 
action, finding that Congress provided for review of agency action with 
the APA and that no special circumstances existed to support the 
extension of a special private right of action in that case. See id. at 
152-54. However, we do not have to decide this aspect 
because ADAPT did 
not properly bring the claim before the District Court. 
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